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Abstract
This study examines the impact of corporate governance on earnings predictability (future cash
flows) for banks operating in 71 countries over the period 2007 to 2016. We find that board
structure and CEO power have a significant influence on future cash flows. In contrast, risk
governance variables have no significant influence. These findings vary between developed
and emerging countries, common and civil law countries, and different sized banks. Board
structure is more effective in predicting future cash flows in civil law and developed countries
than in common law and emerging economies.
Keywords Earnings predictability . Corporate governance . Bank . GAAP/IFRS
JEL Classification G21 . G32 . G38
1 Introduction
An extensive literature examines how corporate governance and reporting quality impacts
earnings but these issues have little been addressed in the banking area. The extant non-bank
literature on earnings quality or earnings management typically link these to possible influ-
ences including: institutional ownership (Velury and Jenkins 2006); book-tax conformity
(Atwood et al. 2010); gender diversity (Ye et al. 2010); board characteristics (Mashayekhi
and Bazaz 2010); internal control regulation (Altamuro and Beatty 2010); employee expenses
(Schiemann and Guenther 2013); the characteristics of chief financial officers (Dichev et al.
2013); and various country-level institutional factors (Kanagaretnam et al. 2014). Our study
extends this literature by using bank governance indicators such as board structure, CEO
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power, and risk governance, to examine the determinants of earnings predictability of future
cash flow (CFOt + 1), a forward-looking earnings quality indicator, of banks from 71 countries
across the globe.
The collapse of the world’s leading financial giants such as Lehman Brothers and Citibank
during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 triggered policy maker interest in bank
governance issues (BIS 2014; OECD 2010). Effective corporate governance in banking is
important given the large information asymmetries, opaqueness and complexities
characterising the sector (Levine 2004). Bank managers face challenging issues arising from
dealing with diverse types of risk (Nichols et al. 2009) and this can force widespread
discretionary managerial choices (Bamber et al. 2010) that may, or may not, be in share-
holders’ interests. Effective governance should encourage banks to take acceptable levels of
risk while minimising the likelihood of bankruptcy (Erkens et al. 2012; Beltratti and Stulz
2012). Such governance structures can help increase financial reporting transparency (Chen
and Jaggi, 2000) and therefore enhance earnings quality as this enables more accurate
prediction of future cash flows. This makes it easier for banks to plan in terms of capital
allocation, investment and meeting regulatory requirements. It also helps boost investor
confidence and managerial reputation.
Moody’s survey1 of 62 international banks illustrates that global banks have been strength-
ening governance practices and addressing attitudes to risk appetite. The survey shows that
banks are restraining managerial discretion relating to delaying the reporting of loan-losses
from non-performing loans and provisioning. This again suggests that effective governance
structures matter for banks’ earnings quality. Moreover, the legal and institutional environment
can also serve as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflicts and ease governance
problems between investors and managers (Bathala and Rao 1995; Mak and Li 2001).
Earnings quality has received considerable policy attention since the global financial crisis
when banking systems were substantially re-shaped (Dechow et al. 2010; Prior et al. 2014) and
new regulations on bank financial reporting quality have subsequently been introduced
(Altamuro and Beatty 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2014). The concept of quality earnings is
fundamental in accounting and financial economics, yet there are broad disagreements about
how it should be defined and measured (Dichev et al. 2013).2 Regarding measurement issues,
the debate focuses on whether ‘accounting-based’ (accruals quality, earnings management,
persistence, predictability, and smoothness) or ‘market-based’ (relevance and timeliness)
indicators are the most appropriate to gauge earnings quality. Conceptually, however, quality
is deemed ‘high’ if current earnings can better predict future cash flows, as well as the long-run
profits, of the firm (Velury and Jenkins 2006; Dichev et al. 2013; Schiemann and Guenther
2013). Quality is regarded as ‘low’ if managers have an incentive to manipulate earnings
figures opportunistically (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 2000; Rosenfield
2000; Dechow et al. 2010). Both agency and signalling theory deal with such manipulation
issues in the context of asymmetric information problems that are reduced through improved
corporate governance and financial reporting standards.
1 See http://ww2.cfo.com/governance/2015/08/risk-governance-improving-big-banks/
2 High-quality earnings have been defined/measured in the literature as those that are: persistent and hence the
best predictor of future long-run sustainable earnings; smooth; predict future earnings; backed by past, present, or
future cash flows; have, and / or have small changes in total accruals that are not linked to fundamentals (Dechow
and Dichev 2002; Schipper and Vincent 2003; Dechow and Schrand 2004; Francis et al. 2004; Kothari et al.
2005; Melumad and Nissim 2009).
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The quality of accounting information derives from International Financial Reporting
System (IFRS) standards and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Under
the IFRS/GAAP framework, the current earnings of firms are reflected in their future operating
cash flows (CFOt + 1).
3 Earnings predictability is an important measure as it deals with how
well past earnings can explain current and future earnings and this can lead to more accurate
valuations as it enables investors to better anticipate expected future cash flows (Velury and
Jenkins 2006; Schiemann and Guenther 2013). Earnings predictability is a forward-looking
measure of earnings quality as opposed to earnings management which is backward-looking. It
provides a better understanding of expected future cash flows (CFOt + 1) derived from the
company cash flow statement rather than the comprehensive income statement, which more
likely determines future bank investment and lending activities (Hasan et al. 2012). Managerial
discretion and manipulation are more pronounced in reporting earnings in the income state-
ment (namely, through accrual-based accounting), than through changes in operational cash
flows (using, cash-basis accounting measures). Despite the importance of earnings quality and
predictability to banks, however, the extant literature is somewhat limited.
Prior banking literature documents that managers use discretion in financial reporting for
several reasons, to: signal private information; manage risk; meet or beat earnings benchmarks;
and to avoid adverse compensation and career consequences (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004, 2010;
Bushman and Williams 2012; Dechow et al. 2012; Dichev et al. 2013). Cornett et al. (2009)
show that U.S banks use their discretion to smooth earnings during periods of low profitability
by delaying the reporting of loan-losses and increasing the realization of securities gains.
Under higher investor protection, banks may prefer forward-looking loan-loss provisioning
and have a greater incentive to recognise larger provisions in order to smooth income – this has
a negative bearing on future earnings predictability. While the purpose of loan-loss provisions
is to adjust banks’ loan-loss reserves to reflect expected future losses, bank managers may also
have incentives to use them to manage earnings and regulatory capital (Ahmed et al. 1999;
Prior et al. 2014). As noted by Pérez et al. (2008) the accrual of loan-loss provisions is left to
bank managers’ discretion. However, the literature is somewhat inconclusive as to the link
between loan-loss provisioning and earnings. Collins et al. (1995) find evidence of a positive
link whereas Beatty et al. (1995) find no evidence of earnings smoothing.
Reforms to IFRS and U.S GAAP have not only made the standards more similar but have
also aimed at improving earnings quality (see Dichev et al. 2013). Barth et al. (2008) contend
that IFRS limits the opportunity of management to engage in opportunistic behaviour by
restricting accounting options available to them. Leventis et al. (2011) also find that IFRS has
been beneficial to users of financial reports as it has reduced opportunistic behaviour in
earnings management. Although, the occurrence of earnings manipulation is hard to unravel
(Dechow et al. 2010), a lack of correspondence between ‘earnings’ and ‘cash flows’ and
deviations from industry and other peer experience can provide helpful indications of earnings
management practice (Dichev et al. 2013). Altamuro and Beatty (2010) argue that internal
control requirements can increase the validity of loan-loss provisioning and this aids (among
other things) earnings persistence and cash flow predictability. Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find
an association between measures of earnings quality (as measured by earnings persistence and
cash flow predictability) and strong country-wide legal, extra-legal and political institutions.
3 Dechow and Schrand (2004) contend that high-quality current earnings is a better predictor of future cash flows
and that earnings with high predictive value are associated with a stronger relation between earnings and future
cash flows (Velury and Jenkins 2006).
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They also find that institutional factors can constrain opportunistic earnings management
behaviour in banks.
The global financial crisis also raised questions about the link between corporate gover-
nance and bank earnings. For non-bank firms it has been shown that weak corporate gover-
nance structures result in poorer earnings quality (du Plessis et al. 2005; Hashim and Devi
2007; Jo and Kim 2007). Developments in corporate governance mechanisms and the
introduction of IFRS/GAAP have generally improved earnings quality and reduced opportu-
nistic behaviour (via tougher monitoring systems) (Dechow et al. 1996; Klein 2002; Xie et al.
2003; Cormier and Martinez 2006; Jo and Kim 2007; Shen and Chih 2007; Kent et al. 2010
and Prencipe and Bar-Yosef 2011). Some of these monitoring mechanisms relate to strength-
ening inside corporate governance through legal and disclosure related legislation (macro-
level), and through improved systems and procedures at the firm-level (micro-level) (Agrawal
and Chadha 2005; Hope and Thomas 2008; Altamuro and Beatty 2010, Holm and Schøler
2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2014). In conjunction with compliance with IFRS/GAAP standards,
various other governance mechanisms such as, board characteristics, CEO power and risk
governance can also (if working properly) positively influence earnings quality by restraining
managerial manipulations detrimental to firm value.
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the predictability of future cash
flows (CFOt + 1), (a forward-looking measure of earnings quality), using a sample of 306 large,
medium and small commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) chartered in 71
countries over the period 2007–2016. Our approach is (to some extent) in-line with Cornett
et al. (2009), Altamuro and Beatty (2010) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2014), where we use the
cash flow predictability measure as the main indicator of earnings quality. Cornett et al. (2009)
study the relationship between earnings management and governance indicators for large U.S
bank holding companies (BHCs). They use data from the 100 largest publicly traded BHCs
from 1994 to 2002 and find that reported earnings, board independence, and capital are
negatively related to earnings management. Altamuro and Beatty (2010) study the effect of
internal control regulation on financial reporting. Based on U.S and international banks over
1986–1992 and 1995–2001 they document improvements in earnings’ persistence and pre-
dictability of cash flows and find evidence of reduced earnings management activity in the
form of benchmark-beating. They also find a decrease in accounting conservatism due to
various internal control regulations. Overall, their main conclusion is that improvements in
internal control monitoring and reporting lead to an enhanced quality of financial reporting in
the banking industry. Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) study the impact of international institutional
factors on earnings quality. Using a large sample of non-US banks from 35 countries over
1993–2006 they report that cash-flow predictability is higher in countries with stronger legal,
extra-legal and political institutional structures. Both studies use loan-loss provisions to
capture earnings management in the banking sector. While our study extends Cornett et al.
(2009), Altamuro and Beatty (2010) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2014), we investigate earnings
predictability of future cash flows (namely, CFOt + 1) and corporate governance relationships
rather than focusing on loan-loss provisions-based earnings management and institutional
factors directly. Moreover, unlike the aforementioned studies, we rely on future cash flows
from the company cash flow statement rather than future earnings or comprehensive perfor-
mance from the income statement, primarily because managerial discretion is greater in
measuring earnings compared to operational cash flows. Given the phenomenon of managerial
discretion and accrual-based earnings, we also argue that current earnings are likely to be a
better predictor of future cash flows compared to current cash flows, consistent with Greenberg
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et al. (1986) and Dechow et al. (1998). As for our key empirical findings, we find that board
structure and CEO power have a significant influence on the earnings predictability of banks.
The results vary for emerging and developed countries, and common and civil law countries as
well as different bank sizes.
Our study contributes to existing research in several ways. First, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to use an extensive international sample of banks across a
large number of countries (71) countries (over 2007–2016) which enables us to investigate the
link between corporate governance and earnings predictability in not only developed and
emerging economies but also across economies with varying legal and other institutional
features. We show a positive and significant relationship between current earnings and CFOt +
1, indicating that current year’s reported earnings are an important predictor of future earnings.
Small boards with more independent directors also help predict future cash flow (CFOt + 1)
whereas CEO duality (where the CEO also acts as the Chairperson) is more likely to have a
negative effect on future earnings predictability. We further report that having a risk committee
member on the board is positively associated with CFOt + 1. These findings are consistent with
both Velury and Jenkins (2006) and Atwood et al. (2010) who show that future cash flows are
positively linked to current earnings.
Second, in-line with Pathan (2009), Pathan and Faff (2013) and Mollah and Zaman (2015) we
argue that bank governance factors are effective in enhancing earnings quality and reducing risks.
Cornett et al. (2009) suggest that corporate governance plays some role in earnings and earnings
management at large U.S. banks as they find a significant negative relationship between earnings
management and board independence. Our focus on the link between corporate governance indicators
andCFOt+1 is motivated by the conceptual framework of IFRS/GAAP,which suggests that users and
investors should obtain quality information from financial reports to assess CFOt+1. We find (as
expected) a significant influence of board structure and CEO power on earnings predictability of our
sample banks (but we do not find any strong relationship with risk governance variables). Our study,
therefore, provides empirical evidence consistent with the signalling theory built on financial reporting
under the IFRS/GAAP regime as well as agency theory predictions from the regulatory environment
concerning board structure and CEO-power in explaining earnings predictability.
Third, banks are highly regulated, compared to non-banks, and need to not only comply
with accounting standards and listing requirements on disclosure, but also on a wide range of
other regulatory requirements (Basel requirements, domestic supervisory regulations and so
on). Among explanations as to why banks exposed themselves to excessive risks during the
run-up to the global financial crisis was that there was a failure of risk management (Ellus and
Yerramilli 2013). This motivates us to investigate whether predicted earnings of banks are
influenced by bank risk governance features. We find little evidence that bank risk governance
features impact earnings predictability.
Finally, while existing studies mainly use samples of large banks, we focus on a broader
range of bank sizes across a larger number of (71) countries. This enables us to investigate
earnings predictability from a wider range of perspectives, namely: across different legal
regimes (civil vs. common law countries); stages of economic development (developed vs.
emerging economies); and for varying bank sizes (large to small). Kanagaretnam et al. (2014)
find that banks’ cash-flow predictability is higher in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal
and political institutional structures. Overall, our results vary between developed and emerging
countries, common and civil law countries, and large, medium and small sized banks. Board
structure is more effective in predicting future cash flows in civil law and developed countries
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than in common law and emerging economies. CEO power reduces future earnings predict-
ability in common law and emerging countries while less so in civil law economies (and to
some extent increasing predictability in developed countries). Risk governance also indicates
variations in influence between civil and common law countries as well as across developed
and emerging economies. In general there is greater similarity in the influence of risk
governance in common law and emerging countries although overall they do not appear to
have a significant influence. Again, governance variables also have a differential influence on
earnings predication for banks of varying size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of
literature and hypotheses on board structure, CEO power and risk governance while Section 3
discusses the methods, data and model specifications; Section 4 focuses on the empirical
results and robustness tests and finally Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.
2 Related literature and hypotheses development
A number of studies measure earnings quality by assessing the ability of earnings to predict
future cash flows (Doyle et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2004; Van der Meulen
et al., 2007; Melumad and Nissim, 2009; Atwood et al. 2010, 2011). Researchers use different
proxies for earnings quality such as: earnings management; accrual quality; earnings predict-
ability; smoothness; persistence; earnings informativeness; and benchmark beating (Francis
et al. 2004; Dichev et al. 2013). Another indicator of quality relates to earnings with a high
predictive value, namely, a strong association with future cash flows. Lipe (1990) considers
earnings predictability as the ability of earnings to explain itself. If past earnings are good
estimates of current earnings, then predictability is said to be high. The quality of firms’
earnings relates to the usefulness of accounting information to financial statement users. While
quality of earnings is a concept having multidimensional constructs, the foundation of earnings
quality derives from the ‘conceptual framework’ of accounting standards, namely the IFRS/
GAAP regime. IFRS/GAAP promote quality disclosure and reporting and as a consequence
financial reports are designed to provide value relevant information. In the IFRS/GAAP
framework, both relevance and reliability are viewed as the two principal qualitative charac-
teristics of earnings numbers. To be relevant, among other things, earnings numbers must have
predictive value. The predictive nature of accounting earnings is also manifest in valuing
firm’s equity which also requires investors to anticipate expected future cash flows (Velury and
Jenkins 2006). Dechow (1994) contends that current earnings generally produce better pre-
dictions of future cash flows. Current earnings figures are believed to be of higher quality the
more they can predict future cash flows, and the quality of current accounting information is
firmly rooted in strict compliance to IFRS/GAAP based accounting standards.
Furthermore, firms with higher earnings quality are more likely to have good governance
systems that signal the reliability of their financial reporting processes (Engel 2005). The direct
and indirect agency costs relating to managerial incentives can be mitigated through several
mechanisms. It is argued that good governance assists in aligning managers’ interests with
those of shareholders via reduced agency costs. Similarly, CEO power has also been found to
be linked to the quality of firm financial statements (Zhang and Wiersema 2009). Agency
theory predicts that powerful CEOs tend to be entrenched and operate detrimentally (to
shareholders) by extracting private benefits of control, including, empire building (Jensen
1986). Good governance therefore recommends the separation of the role of CEO and
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Chairperson as well as promoting a larger number of independent board members (Shleifer
and Vishny 1997). In the same vein (and since the global financial crisis) it has been suggested
that risk management mechanisms be emphasised more in the governance of banks and other
financial firms (Mongiardino and Plath 2010; Sabato 2010; Aebi et al. 2012). In particular, the
aforementioned studies emphasize greater risk-reporting to the board (rather than the CEO),
and to check the power of CEOs thus reducing possibilities for opportunistic behaviour. The
following incorporates these issues in our methodology on bank earnings predictability as
outlined below.
2.1 Board structure and earnings predictability
Agency theory suggests that board independence acts as a watchdog over a firm’s operations
and provides monitoring incentives for reducing agency costs. The existence of independent
directors on the board therefore is expected to enhance earnings ability to predict future cash
flows. Chen and Jaggi (2000) provide evidence that board independence is crucial in influenc-
ing the level of superior financial reporting. Cheng and Courtney (2006) document a signif-
icant positive association between the proportion of independent directors and the extent of
reporting quality.
Again, board size is also one of the factors influencing the effectiveness of board oversight
duties. There has been continued debate on the role of board size, although agency theory
suggests that larger boards support more effective monitoring (Coles et al. 2008; Pathan 2009).
Small boards are favoured for: being easier to co-ordinate; quicker in making decisions; less
likely to have free-rider problems; and more likely to be innovative (Dimitropoulos and
Asteriou 2010; Mollah and Zaman 2015; Pathan 2009). Xie et al. (2003, p. 300) point out
that BA smaller board may be less encumbered with bureaucratic problems and may be more
functional. Smaller boards may provide better financial reporting oversight^. Vafeas (2000)
and Cho and Rui (2009) find that earnings numbers of firms with small boards are more
informative. However, there are opposing views about large boards and their role in monitor-
ing. Empirical studies conclude that a greater number of board members will likely lead to
more independent directors and provide more expertise, experience, knowledge and diversity
and increase the board’s monitoring capacity (Dalton et al. 1998; John and Senbet 1998;
Dalton et al. 1999; Linck et al. 2008). Rahman and Ali (2006), however, point out that large
boards can be less effective in reducing earnings manipulation.
Given the mixed evidence on board independence, size and earnings quality, we hypoth-
esize that board structure,4 especially a strong board structure (smaller board size and greater
independence) helps improve the earnings predictability of banks:
H1: Board structure has an effect on earnings predictability.
Or - Small and independent boards have a positive effect on earnings predictability.
2.2 CEO power and earnings predictability
The governance literature defines CEO power in a variety of ways: CEO duality; internally-
hired CEO; and CEO tenure (May 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Morck et al. 1989;
4 We define board structure by combining these two variables.
Journal of Financial Services Research
Adams et al. 2005; Pathan 2009; Fracassi and Tate 2012; Mollah and Zaman 2015). A CEO
becomes more powerful when they also chair the board (CEO-duality) and such power grows
with employment tenure and if the CEO is internally-hired (Pathan 2009; Fracassi and Tate
2012; Mollah and Zaman 2015). CEO power can be entrenched thereby restricting information
flows to other board directors, impacting board decisions and undermining the board’s
independence to oversee managers. Pathan (2009) documents that CEO power is negatively
related to bank risk-taking, namely, bank CEOs have incentives to take less risk to secure their
jobs and human capital investment by accepting some safe value-reducing projects, and
rejecting risky but value-increasing projects (May 1995; Saunders and Cornett 2006). Simi-
larly, in the earnings informativeness literature, CEO duality seems to have a detrimental effect
on the usefulness of earnings numbers (Gul and Lai 2002; Anderson et al. 2003; Firth et al.
2007). Combining two roles (chairperson and CEO) along with longer tenure exacerbates the
potential for managing earnings, thus impairing the quality of reported earnings (Saleh et al.
2005; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef 2011). Similarly, other CEO characteristics, such as whether the
CEO was an internal appointment and the length of tenure can also have a negative bearing on
financial statement quality and therefore earnings predictability (Pathan 2009; Fracassi and
Tate 2012). Following the aforementioned agency theory views we propose a second
hypothesis:
H2: CEO power has a negative effect on earnings predictability.
Or- CEO-duality, CEO-internal and CEO tenure have negative effects on earnings
predictability.
2.3 Risk governance and earnings predictability
In recent years, risk management has become an integral part of governance in the banking
sector. Mongiardino and Plath (2010) outline best practice in banking risk governance and
highlight the need to have at least a dedicated board-level risk committee, of which a majority
of members should be independent, and also that the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) should be part
of the bank’s board (Aebi et al. 2012). Both Aebi et al. (2012) and Ellus and Yerramilli (2013)
note that risk governance (having a CRO on the board as well as a Risk Management
Committee) matters for bank risk-taking as they perform risk monitoring functions. As banks
are at the center of undertaking risky business, the main purpose of the risk management
function is to mitigate the risk of large losses, known as tail risk (Ellus and Yerramilli 2013).
Ellus and Yerramilli (2013) suggest that a strong and independent risk management function in
banks can curtail such tail risk exposures. Kashyap et al. (2008) and Stulz (2008) also contend
that the presence of a strong and independent risk management team is necessary to control tail
risk exposures of financial institutions.
Policy makers around the globe have emphasized the importance of appropriate risk
management practices being applied in financial institutions, including the existence of a
risk management committee and appointment of a CRO (Brancato et al. 2006; Sabato
2010). Therefore, risk governance mechanisms, together with clear CRO reporting lines
are important components of bank corporate governance. A strong risk management
function is necessary to correctly identify risks and prevent excessive risk-taking
(Kashyap et al. 2008; Stulz 2008) that cannot be controlled entirely by regulatory
supervision or external market discipline (Ellus and Yerramilli 2013). Similarly, the role
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of the CRO and other risk managers is also important to evaluate the viability of bank’s
loans and other investments. Risk managers or CROs can limit a bank’s propensity for
excessive risk-taking.
Again, female directors are Bmore risk-averse to fraud and opportunistic earnings
management^ (Man and Wong 2013, p. 391) than their male counterparts. In suggesting that
women are generally more conservative and less inclined to take excessive risks in banks
(Palvia et al. 2014), Sunden and Surette (1998) also reveal that female directors are more risk-
averse in making decisions. Srinidhi et al. (2011) demonstrate that the participation of woman
directors on boards increases the quality of reported earnings. But, Sun et al. (2010) find no
relationship between female directors and earnings management and Berger et al. (2014)
indicate that a higher proportion of female board members increases bank portfolio risks.
Despite diverse results on the link between risk governance and earnings predictability, we
propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Risk governance has a positive effect on earnings predictability
Or the presence of a - Risk committee, chief risk officer and female directors have a
positive effect on earnings predictability.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data
We primarily focus on a sample of (all) listed commercial banks and BHCs with accounting
data available in Bankscope and market data available in Datastream over 2007–2016. We
retain only institutions with an independent ownership structure defined by the database (non-
independent banks such as subsidiaries can be influenced by the parent). The remaining banks
should have at least four years of accounting, market and governance data. The selection
criterion leads to a sample of 306 banks from 71 countries. We present the sample distribution
in terms of country and year in Table 1. Panel A shows the country distribution, which
indicates a high proportion of banks in Japan and the U.S. For example, we have 61 banks
from Japan and 27 from the US in the sample.
3.2 Methodology
First we apply OLS estimation to our baseline models and then two-step system GMM for
robustness checks. System GMM can effectively address endogeneity/causality concerns
between the variables used (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998; Arellano
and Honoré 2001).
3.3 Model specification
We use the following model to test our hypotheses in-line with Cornett et al. (2009), Altamuro
and Beatty (2010), Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) and others in the literature:
CFOi; tþ1ð Þ ¼ αþ β1 ROIAAi;t þ β2 CGi;t þ β3 ROIAAi;t* CGi;t þ β4X i;t þ β5MEit þ εi;tð1Þ
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Where, CFOi,(t + 1) is the cash flow from operations at time t + 1 (CFOi,(t + 1) is the proxy used to
test for earnings predictability). ROIAAi,t is the current profitability (return on operating income
by average assets), CG,it is a matrix of firm level corporate governance variables of bank i at
time t, ROIAAi,t * CGi,t is the interaction term, Xi,t is a matrix of firm-level control variables of
bank i at time t, MEit is a matrix of country level macroeconomic variables at time t, εi,t is the
error term, α0 is the constant, and α, β, γ and δ are the vectors of coefficient estimates. All
hypotheses are linked to the CG matrix, which includes board structure (board size, board
independence), CEO power (CEO-duality, CEO-internal and CEO tenure) and risk governance
(risk committee, chief risk officer and female directors) variables. In addition, IFRS, Big-4
audit firms, 1/Z-score (risk-taking), Tier-1 capital, deposit insurance, log total assets and GDP
are used as control variables. The descriptions of these variables are shown in Table 2.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
The summary statistics for earnings predictability, corporate and risk governance, and
firm and country-level control variables are shown in Table 2. The panel data comprising
observations for each bank span the 2007 to 2016 period and include 306 publicly-listed
banks. The mean (median) of CFOt + 1 as the proxy for earnings predictability is 0.022
(0.019) indicating that average earnings predictability is positive. The mean (median) of
current earnings is also 0.022 (0.019). Similarly, the average value of an alternative
proxy for earnings predictability - the standard deviation of the residuals (ѵj) from
equation Earnj , t = ϕ0 , j + ϕ1 , jEarnj , t - 1 + ѵ j , t deflated by firm j’s total assets
(RESTDEV_ROIAA) - is 0.014 (0.010), which is also positive. Regarding the corporate
governance variables, we find that mean board size is 12 and on average, independent
directors constitute around 51% of board members. Again, about 24% of CEOs also have
the co-role as Chairperson and almost 78% of them are internally promoted with an
average tenure of 5 years. Turning to the risk governance variables, nearly 82% of the
sample banks have risk committees and 49% have a CRO. The percentage of female
directors is relatively low, approximately 10%. For control variables, we find 54% of
banks report their accounts under IFRS and 85% are audited by the Big-4 audit firms.
The mean inverse Z-score (1/Z represents an insolvency risk measure), Tier 1 capital and
deposit insurance variable for the sample are, respectively, 0.618, 0.093 and 0.404.
Finally, log total asset and log GDP size have mean values, respectively of, 17.061
and 27.315.
The correlation matrix shows that current earnings, corporate governance, and risk gover-
nance variables typically have a positive relationship with CFOt + 1, (with the exceptions of our
board independence and risk committee measures which suggest a negative link).5 Among the
control variables, IFRS and total assets also have a negative link to CFOt + 1, and Big4 a
positive relationship. The correlation matrix indicates no sign of serious multi-collinearity
among the explanatory variables.6
5 Available from the authors on request.
6 None of the correlation coefficients are more than the 80% threshold, indicating an absence of multi-collinearity
(Hair et al. 2006).
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Table 3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Predictability
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROIAA 0.112* 0.123* 0.123*
(1.68) (1.86) (1.86)
LNBOARD 0.007** 0.008** 0.008**
(2.11) (2.53) (2.53)
INDEPENDENT −0.007* −0.005 −0.005
(−1.86) (−1.38) (−1.38)
CEO-DUALITY 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.93) (1.12) (1.12)
CEO-INTERNAL 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.76) (0.10) (0.10)
CEO-TENURE −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.81) (−0.81) (−0.81)
RISK-COMMITTEE −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(−1.02) (−1.01) (−1.01)
RISK-OFFICER 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.46) (0.18) (0.18)
FEMALE 0.004 −0.002 −0.002
(0.38) (−0.21) (−0.21)
ROIAA* LNBOARD −0.052* −0.057** −0.057**
(−1.92) (−2.12) (−2.12)
ROIAA*INDEPENDENT 0.083** 0.068** 0.068**
(2.53) (2.06) (2.06)
ROIAA*CEO-DUALITY −0.066*** −0.065*** −0.065***
(−3.19) (−3.12) (−3.12)
ROIAA*CEO-INTERNAL 0.008 0.013 0.013
(0.35) (0.57) (0.57)
ROIAA*CEO-TENURE 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.97) (0.82) (0.82)
ROIAA*RISK-COMMITTEE 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(4.25) (4.18) (4.18)
ROIAA*RISK-OFFICER −0.052** −0.048** −0.048**
(−2.34) (−2.20) (−2.20)
ROIAA*FEMALE −0.011 0.040 0.040
(−0.12) (0.42) (0.42)
IFRS 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(4.33) (4.32) (4.32)
BIG4 0.004* 0.003 0.003
(1.84) (1.54) (1.54)
LNTA −0.001*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−2.94) (−4.15) (−4.15)
LNGDP −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003***
(−5.03) (−4.47) (−4.47)
Z 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.17) (1.38) (1.38)
TIER1 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(7.13) (6.81) (6.81)
DINSUR −0.020*** −0.021*** −0.021***
(−5.56) (−6.05) (−6.05)
BHC DUMMY 0.008*** 0.008***
(3.54) (3.54)
STD. ROIAA 0.028 0.028
(1.31) (1.31)
CRISIS DUMMY −0.003
(−0.75)
Constant 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(6.23) (6.11) (6.11)
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4.2 Multivariate regression analysis
4.2.1 Corporate governance and earnings predictability
Table 3 reports the results of regressions 1–3. Model 1 represents a base estimation of current
earnings (ROIAA) and its interaction with corporate governance variables separately for board
structure, CEO power and the risk governance variables. Models 2–3 include a couple of
controls, such as whether the bank is a BHC or not and a dummy for the 2008–2009 financial
crisis, respectively.
All three models in Table 3 reveal a positive and significant relationship between current
earnings and CFOt + 1 (at the 10% level), indicating that the current year’s reported earnings are
an important predictor of future cash flow. These results confirm that quality earnings in the
IFRS/GAAP framework have significant predictive power in determining bank CFOt + 1. The
finding is also consistent with Velury and Jenkins (2006) who show a positive and significant
relationship between earnings and cash flows, as well as Atwood et al. (2010) who find that
future cash flows are positively linked to current earnings.
Model 1 presents the effects of the interaction terms of current earnings and governance
variables (namely, board size and independence; CEO-duality; CEO-internal and CEO-
tenure; risk committee; chief risk officer; and female director) on CFOt + 1. The results of
the interaction variables are largely consistent with our main hypotheses suggesting a
‘complementary’ link between earnings and governance in explaining CFOt + 1. Firstly, on
board structure variables (board size and independence), we find a significant negative
relationship between CFOt + 1 and the interactive variable of accounting earnings and board
size (ROIAA*LNBOARD) (10% level) illustrating that a small bank board is capable of
predicting future cash flows. Conversely, the interactive variable of accounting earnings
and independent boards (ROIAA*INDEPENDENT) has a positive significant impact on
CFOt + 1 (5% level). So it appears that a small board with more independent directors helps
predict future bank cash flows. The findings remain unchanged in all the models (Models
2–3), hence, our H1 is fully supported. The results are also consistent with those of Al-
Dhamari and Ismail (2013) (although they contrast with those from Mashayekhi and Bazaz
2010).
Secondly, with respect to CEO power (CEO-duality, CEO-internal and CEO-tenure), we
find (as expected) a negative relation between CFOt + 1 and the interactive variable of earnings
and CEO-duality (5% level). So CEO-duality reduces earnings quality / predictability. The
variable that interacts earnings with CEO-internal and CEO-tenure shows a positive but
insignificant relation with CFOt + 1. These findings partially support our H2, and it seems that
bank CEOs are more aligned to pursuing their own rather than the firms’ interests.
Table 3 (continued)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Observations 735 735 735
R-squared 0.37 0.38 0.38
This Table reports the OLS regression results between earnings predictability, current earnings, and interactive
corporate governance variables. The dependent variable is CFOt + 1. The variables descriptions are presented in
Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Finally, with regard to the risk governance variables (risk committee, chief risk officer and
female director), we report mixed results for the effects of the variable that interacts earnings
with the risk indicators and bank CFOt + 1. Consistent with expectations, we report that the risk
committee interaction variable is positively associated with CFOt + 1 (1% level), illustrating that
it is capable of helping to improve earnings quality and hence predict future cash flow.
However, the chief risk officer interaction variable reveals a significantly negative effect on
CFOt + 1, (contrary to expectations), while the female director interaction variable has no
significant relationship. These mixed findings lead us to marginally support our H3.
Again, both Model 2 and Model 3 extend the analysis of Model 1 with other control
variables, respectively, for the effect of being a bank holding company (BHC) and during the
period of the global financial crisis (2008–2009). In both models we observe that the results
reflect those from Model 1 (for all interactive corporate governance and earnings variables) in
terms of explaining CFOt + 1. In addition, Model 2, which includes the volatility in current
earnings (std_roiaa) as an additional variable, also documents a positive significant effect of
bank holding company status and future earnings, while there is a positive but insignificant
effect of earnings volatility on CFOt + 1. Further tests also indicate no significant effects on
future earnings,7 so volatility in current earnings is not an issue in determining future earnings.
Furthermore, Model 3 also shows that there was no significant effect of the global financial
crisis in terms of being able to predict future bank earnings over the sample period.
With regard to the control variables in Models 1–3, we observe consistent findings for the
IFRS dummy and Tier 1 capital variable indicating a positive influence on CFOt + 1. The IFRS
dummy has a positive link to CFOt + 1, which is consistent with expectations. The results also
illustrate that capital adequacy, as a regulatory requirement and an indicator of bank solvency,
is a predictor of future earnings. On the other hand, deposit insurance, bank size (total assets)
and GDP variables show a negative relation with CFOt + 1. Even though deposit insurance is a
safeguard to protect deposit holders, it lowers the ability to predict future CFO (CFOt + 1)
perhaps reflecting the confounding effect of moral hazard on bank’s future earnings. Similarly,
smaller bank size and country GDP increases the predictive power of future earnings –
possibly because banking business is less complex in these countries. Finally, bank risk (z
score) does not explain future bank earnings across any of our estimates, while there is a
positive significant relation between audit quality (Big-4 audit firms) and CFOt + 1 found in
Model 1 only.
4.2.2 Corporate governance indices and earnings predictability
To check the validity of our earlier results (Table 3), we construct three corporate governance
indices and conduct the regression analysis between the indices, their interactions with
accounting earnings and earnings predictability (CFOt + 1). We construct strong board, CEO
power and strong risk governance based on corporate governance variables.8 Table 4 Models
1–3 show the relationship between the interacted governance and other control variables,
respectively, with CFOt + 1.
7 The results are not reported due to space, but are available on request.
8 ‘Strong board’ is defined as having a board size (number of members) lower than the median and a greater than
median number of independent directors. CEO power is defined as having an internally appointed CEO that
plays a dual role and who has board tenure higher than median. Similarly, strong risk governance is defined as
having both a risk committee and risk officer as well as having a greater than median number of female board
members.
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Table 4 reveals a strong positive and significant relationship between current earnings and
CFOt + 1 at the 1% level across the three models thus reinforcing that the current year’s reported
earnings is an important predictor of future cash flow. In Model 1 of Table 4, the strong board
index interactive variable shows a negative effect on CFOt + 1 (10% level). This moderately
supports our findings in Table 3 and H1, implying that current earnings and strong boards have
sufficient explanatory power to determine future earnings. With regard to our CEO power
index interactive variable we also find a strong negative and significant relation with CFOt + 1
at the 1% level (in contrast to Table 3 findings). Therefore, H2 is fully supported, namely that
powerful bank CEOs tend to pursue their own interests over firms’ interest and this is reflected
in less predictable (poorer quality) future earnings. As for strong risk governance we find a
Table 4 Corporate Governance Indices and Earnings Predictability
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROIAA 0.343*** 0.356*** 0.356***
(9.85) (11.02) (11.02)
STRONG-BOARD 0.010 0.004 0.004
(1.62) (0.62) (0.62)
CEO-POWER 0.012 0.011 0.011
(1.47) (1.46) (1.46)
STRONG-RISK-GOVERNANCE 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(2.86) (3.27) (3.27)
ROIAA*STRONG-BOARD −0.13* −0.053 −0.053
(−1.89) (−0.86) (−0.86)
ROIAA*CEO-POWER −0.201*** −0.155*** −0.155***
(−3.14) (−2.61) (−2.61)
ROIAA-STRONG-RISK-GOVERNANCE −0.202*** −0.241*** −0.241***
(−3.70) (−4.77) (−4.77)
IFRS 0.002 −0.003 −0.003
(0.39) (−0.65) (−0.65)
BIG4 −0.005 0.003 0.003
(−0.86) (0.59) (0.59)
LNTA 0.001 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.61) (4.29) (4.29)
LNGDP −0.002* 0.001 0.001
(−1.84) (0.69) (0.69)
Z 0.001 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.90) (2.77) (2.77)
TIER1 0.060* 0.062** 0.062**
(1.94) (2.17) (2.17)
DINSUR −0.008 −0.006 −0.006
(−0.97) (−0.71) (−0.71)
BHC DUMMY 0.006 0.006
(1.14) (1.14)
STD. ROIAA −0.738*** −0.738***
(−15.18) (−15.18)
CRISIS DUMMY −0.011
(−1.05)
Constant 0.058 −0.067* −0.068*
(1.53) (−1.85) (−1.85)
Observations 1407 1407 1407
R-squared 0.08 0.22 0.22
This Table reports the OLS regression results between earnings predictability, current earnings, and interactive
strong-board, CEO-power, and risk-governance variables. The dependent variable is CFOt + 1. The variables
descriptions are presented in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5 Corporate Governance and Earnings Predictability (Civil Law vs. Common Law Countries)
Civil Law Countries Common Law Countries
Panel A Panel B
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROIAA 0.163** 0.148* 0.148* 0.185 0.236* 0.236*
(2.08) (1.96) (1.96) (1.31) (1.68) (1.68)
LNBOARD 0.006* 0.007** 0.007** 0.004 0.006 0.006
(1.85) (2.02) (2.02) (0.57) (0.93) (0.93)
INDEPENDENT −0.007* −0.007* −0.007* −0.006 −0.003 −0.003
(−1.65) (−1.65) (−1.65) (−0.91) (−0.49) (−0.49)
CEO-DUALITY −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
(−0.55) (−1.53) (−1.53) (1.04) (1.23) (1.23)
CEO-INTERNAL 0.003 0.002 0.0025 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.99) (0.72) (0.72) (0.42) (0.04) (0.03)
CEO-TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.57) (1.18) (1.18) (−1.18) (−0.84) (−0.84)
RISK-COMMITTEE −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.008* −0.007 −0.007
(−0.58) (−1.27) (−1.27) (−1.67) (−1.46) (−1.46)
RISK-OFFICER −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 0.0103** 0.010** 0.010**
(−1.17) (−0.47) (−0.47) (2.36) (2.26) (2.26)
FEMALE −0.007 −0.008 −0.008 0.021 0.010 0.010
(−0.65) (−0.75) (−0.75) (0.92) (0.45) (0.45)
ROIAA* LNBOARD −0.056* −0.064** −0.064** −0.056 −0.078 −0.078
(−1.93) (−2.29) (−2.29) (−0.88) (−1.23) (−1.23)
ROIAA*INDEPENDENT 0.104** 0.075* 0.075* 0.058 0.048 0.048
(2.34) (1.73) (1.73) (1.07) (0.87) (0.87)
ROIAA*CEO-DUALITY −0.014 0.025 0.025 −0.098*** −0.099*** −0.099***
(−0.49) (0.86) (0.86) (−2.91) (−2.97) (−2.97)
ROIAA*CEO-INTERNAL −0.071* −0.058 −0.058 −0.005 −0.002 −0.002
(−1.93) (−1.62) (−1.62) (−0.14) (−0.047) (−0.047)
ROIAA*CEO-TENURE −0.001 −0.002 −0.00207 0.00255 0.00199 0.00199
(−0.18) (−0.72) (−0.718) (0.942) (0.745) (0.745)
ROIAA*RISK-COMMITTEE 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238***
(0.58) (1.47) (1.47) (4.57) (4.61) (4.61)
ROIAA*RISK-OFFICER 0.0530* 0.0394 0.0394 −0.229*** −0.225*** −0.225***
(1.774) (1.364) (1.364) (−5.606) (−5.610) (−5.610)
ROIAA*FEMALE −0.11 −0.066 −0.066 0.121 0.190 0.190
(−0.861) (−0.515) (−0.515) (0.73) (1.14) (1.14)
IFRS 0.005 0.008** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.008**
(1.37) (2.24) (2.24) (2.68) (2.04) (2.04)
BIG4 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(−0.56) (−1.219) (−1.22) (0.92) (0.61) (0.61)
LNTA −0.002** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.001* −0.001** −0.001**
(−2.16) (−3.62) (−3.62) (−1.82) (−2.17) (−2.17)
LNGDP −0.003*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002** −0.003** −0.003**
(−3.36) (−2.99) (−2.99) (−2.50) (−2.58) (−2.58)
Z 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(1.22) (1.02) (1.02) (1.25) (0.69) (0.69)
TIER1 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.128*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(2.77) (3.10) (3.10) (6.67) (6.03) (6.03)
DINSUR −0.052*** −0.058*** −0.0580*** −0.003 −0.006 −0.006
(−7.18) (−8.05) (−8.05) (−0.66) (−1.10) (−1.10)
BHC DUMMY 0.003 0.003 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.71) (0.71) (3.63) (3.63)
STD. ROIAA 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.001 0.001
(5.18) (5.18) (0.03) (0.03)
CRISIS DUMMY −0.003 0.001
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negative significant influence on CFOt + 1 at the 1% level, indicating risk governance mecha-
nisms are not effective in predicting future earnings. Therefore, H3 is not supported. Looking at
the remaining estimates and the influence of other controls we mainly find qualitatively similar
results in Table 4 as in Table 3.
4.2.3 Corporate governance and earnings predictability in different legal jurisdictions
(common law versus civil law countries)
Following Table 4 Models 1–3, we re-estimate similar models after splitting the sample
into banks based in common or civil law countries. The results are reported in Tables 5
Models 1–3 of Panels A and Panel B. In Panel A estimates for the civil law countries are
reported and here we see that the interactions variables with current earnings reveal
findings as reported in Table 4 for board structure variables but not for CEO power and
risk governance variables. In Panel B of Table 5 the findings for banks operating in
common law countries shows that CEO power and risk governance variables (but not
board structure) improve cash flow prediction. In sum, the findings for common law
countries generally confirm our earlier findings reported in Table 3. Clearly there are legal
differences across countries that influence the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in
enhancing bank earnings quality.
4.2.4 Corporate governance and earnings predictability for banks operating
in developed and emerging countries, and for institutions of varying size
In Table 6 (Models 1–3 of Panels A and B), we re-estimate the same regression after splitting
the sample based on countries’ state of economic development (developed vs. emerging) from
the IMF definition. Panel A reports the results for banks operating in developed countries
where the board structure interaction variables with current earnings (rather than CEO power
and risk governance structure interaction indicators with current earnings) are found to have a
significant influence on future cash flows. We find that both CEO-duality and female directors
have a positive link to CFOt + 1, suggesting that bank CEOs and female directors are more
likely to provide positive signals to the market to maintain sustained earnings for banks. In
Table 5 (continued)
Civil Law Countries Common Law Countries
Panel A Panel B
(−0.69) (0.05)
Constant 0.128*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.0866*** 0.088*** 0.088***
(5.88) (6.64) (6.64) (2.60) (2.63) (2.63)
Observations 341 341 341 378 378 378
R-squared 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.51
This Table reports the OLS regression results between earnings predictability, current earnings, and interactive
corporate governance variables in the Civil Law and Common Law countries. The dependent variable is CFOt + 1.
The variables descriptions are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports the effect of current earnings and interactive
corporate governance variables on CFOt + 1 in Civil Law countries. Panel B reports the effect of current earnings
and interactive corporate governance variables on CFOt + 1 in Common Law countries. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6 Corporate Governance and Earnings Predictability (Developed Vs. Emerging Countries)
Developed Countries Emerging Countries
Panel A Panel B
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROIAA 0.082 0.085 0.085 1.084*** 1.136*** 1.136***
(1.39) (1.44) (1.44) (5.27) (5.62) (5.62)
LNBOARD 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.98) (1.04) (1.04)
INDEPENDENT 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.0056
(1.42) (1.54) (1.54) (1.25) (0.77) (0.77)
CEO-DUALITY −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(−2.73) (−3.08) (−3.08) (5.74) (5.87) (5.87)
CEO-INTERNAL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.010* 0.012** 0.012**
(0.44) (0.36) (0.36) (1.78) (2.01) (2.01)
CEO-TENURE 0.001 0.001* 0.001* −0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.47) (1.69) (1.69) (−0.67) (0.13) (0.13)
RISK-COMMITTEE 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.022*** −0.024*** −0.024***
(0.39) (0.12) (0.12) (−3.36) (−3.69) (−3.69)
RISK-OFFICER −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 0.0043 0.004 0.004
(−1.36) (−1.48) (−1.48) (1.02) (0.91) (0.91)
FEMALE −0.015* −0.014* −0.014* −0.002 −0.006 −0.006
(−1.92) (−1.81) (−1.81) (−0.10) (−0.28) (−0.28)
ROIAA* LNBOARD −0.037 −0.041* −0.041* −0.146 −0.174 −0.174
(−1.64) (−1.79) (−1.79) (−1.14) (−1.38) (−1.38)
ROIAA*INDEPENDENT 0.016 0.009 0.009 −0.215* −0.156 −0.156
(0.65) (0.38) (0.38) (−1.91) (−1.40) (−1.40)
ROIAA*CEO-DUALITY 0.033** 0.040** 0.040** −0.560*** −0.546*** −0.546***
(2.06) (2.50) (2.50) (−7.59) (−7.39) (−7.39)
ROIAA*CEO-INTERNAL −0.011 −0.007 −0.007 −0.303*** −0.332*** −0.332***
(−0.69) (−0.45) (−0.45) (−3.17) (−3.54) (−3.54)
ROIAA*CEO-TENURE −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.007 −0.010 −0.010
(−0.54) (−0.96) (−0.96) (−0.86) (−1.34) (−1.34)
ROIAA*RISK-COMMITTEE 0.017 0.024 0.024 0.491*** 0.523*** 0.523***
(0.89) (1.27) (1.27) (4.01) (4.35) (4.35)
ROIAA*RISK-OFFICER 0.025 0.025 0.025 −0.180*** −0.175*** −0.175***
(1.51) (1.55) (1.55) (−2.80) (−2.77) (−2.77)
ROIAA*FEMALE 0.130* 0.133* 0.133* −0.043 −0.004 −0.004
(1.90) (1.94) (1.94) (−0.10) (−0.010) (−0.010)
IFRS 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(5.05) (5.31) (5.31) (2.93) (3.00) (3.00)
BIG4 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
LNTA −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002**
(−3.53) (−3.78) (−3.78) (1.79) (2.10) (2.10)
LNGDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(1.03) (0.85) (0.85) (−0.23) (−0.17) (−0.17)
Z 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.008* 0.007*
(0.59) (0.39) (0.39) (1.00) (1.70) (1.70)
TIER1 0.033** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.076***
(2.57) (2.72) (2.72) (4.37) (4.00) (4.00)
DINSUR −0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.015*** −0.017*** −0.017***
(−0.092) (0.078) (0.078) (−3.04) (−3.49) (−3.49)
BHC DUMMY −0.001 −0.001 0.007** 0.007**
(−0.36) (−0.36) (2.17) (2.17)
STD. ROIAA 0.045*** 0.045*** −0.170** −0.170**
(2.94) (2.94) (−2.57) (−2.57)
CRISIS DUMMY −0.00323 −0.002
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Panel B the estimates for banks operating in emerging countries are reported and here our
findings are similar to those in Table 3 for CEO power and risk governance interaction
variables with current earnings, while not for board structure interaction variables. Clearly
stages of economic development impact bank earnings quality.
We also re-estimate the same regression after splitting the sample according to bank asset
size.9 The findings are somewhat mixed for large and medium-sized banks, although for
smaller banks we do find stronger evidence that board structure and CEO power interaction
variables help predict future bank earnings.
4.2.5 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our findings, we estimate our baseline regressions using an
alternative earnings predictability measure following Francis et al. (2004). This proxy is the
standard deviation of the residuals (ѵj) defined from equation Earnj,t =ϕ0,j +ϕ1,jEarnj,t-1 + ѵj,t
deflated by firm j’s total assets, where Earnj,t = firms j’s net income before extraordinary items
in year t, larger standard deviation of the residuals (ѵj) reflects lower earnings predictability.
Our findings10 show a positive and significant relationship between current earnings and
CFOt + 1 at the 10% level, consistent with the baseline findings in Table 3. Overall, board size
has a negative relation, independent boards and interactive variable of earnings and indepen-
dent boards a positive influence on future earnings predictability and supporting H1. Other
findings also show that CEO power and interactive variables with earnings do not help predict
future earnings (supporting H2.) and we do not find any support for an influence of risk
governance factors and their interactive variables with earnings (no support for H3).
Finally, we re-estimate eq. 1 using the two-step system GMM approach11 adopted by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to help deal with potential
Table 6 (continued)
Developed Countries Emerging Countries
Panel A Panel B
(−1.233) (−0.12)
Constant −0.002 0.005 0.005 −0.056** −0.061** −0.061**
(−0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (−1.99) (−2.24) (−2.24)
Observations 472 472 472 263 263 263
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.76 0.77 0.77
This Table reports the OLS regression results between earnings predictability, current earnings, and interactive
corporate governance variables in the Developed and Emerging countries. The dependent variable is CFOt + 1.
The variables descriptions are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports the effect of current earnings and interactive
corporate governance variables on CFOt + 1 in Developed countries. Panel B reports the effect of current earnings
and interactive corporate governance variables on CFOt + 1 in Emerging countries. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
9 Estimates are available from the authors on request.
10 Estimates are available from the authors on request.
11 The GMM estimates are available from the authors on request.
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endogeneity/causality issues. Overall the main findings are in accordance with those reported
in Table 3, namely, that board structure, CEO power and their interactive variables with
earnings have a significant influence on the earnings predictability of banks, but this is not
the case for the risk governance measures and their interactive variables with earnings.
5 Conclusion
We examine the impact of corporate governance on earnings predictability in all listed banks
from 71 countries over the period of 2007–2016 in the light of IFRS/GAAP. High quality
accounting numbers are important to banks (as well as other firms) because without accurate
accounting information they are unable to precisely estimate their future earnings prospects
and valuations. Under IFRS/GAAP frameworks we posit that higher quality reported bank
earnings should be a better predictor of future earnings. Corporate governance mechanisms
can also mitigate agency problems and enhance bank performance. Since operating earnings
are a key contributor to bank performance, governance mechanisms should be in place to
promote disclosure quality and ensure sustained earnings. Effective governance provides
positive signals to the market regarding the capacity of the firm to generate sufficient earnings
over time. Good governance should lead to quality disclosure and earnings and improved
financial reporting that ultimately protect investors’ interests and restrain managerial
opportunism.
In particular, we evaluate whether current earnings, board structure and CEO power as
well as the risk governance features of banks can effectively predict future cash flows
(CFOt + 1). Our results consistently suggest that CFOt + 1 is positively associated with
current earnings. Interactive governance variables relating to board structure and current
earnings generally show high explanatory power in influencing future CFO, as expected.
However, such explanatory power tends to lessen in common law and emerging countries.
Again, we find interactive CEO power variables reduce the predictability of future bank
cash flows (CFOt + 1). However, the negative effects of CEO power variables are more
noticeable in common law and emerging countries. We also find that risk governance
variables have little impact on earnings predictability. Further differences are observed for
the influence of governance variables on different sized banks. Overall, these results
suggest that the IFRS/GAAP disclosure regime and powerful board structure can contrib-
ute to determine future bank cash flows. These findings are robust to different sub-samples
covering country legal status (common law/civil law), stages of economic development
(developed/emerging) and different bank sizes.
Our results imply the importance of the accounting regime – IFRS/GAAP – and more
specifically quality earnings as instrumental in reflecting future bank cash flows. The effects
of standard governance interactive measures on earnings predictability, in particular small
and independent boards enhance earnings predictability while CEO power tends to lessen
predictability. Risk governance interactive features appear to have at best a marginal influ-
ence. The study highlights how board structure and risk governance features can influence
earnings quality and highlights differences that occur depending on whether banks operate in
various legal regimes (civil versus common law), and varying stages of economic develop-
ment (developed versus. emerging) and for different bank sizes. Policymakers should
perhaps consider strengthening the risk governance features of banks as these appear to have
a limited influence on bank earnings quality.
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